What power makes old energy age?
Two fast-rising star companies,
Why fall into the abyss at the same speed?
What can I learn from this expensive game?
"Now, during this time, what do you want me to say?" One day at the end of September, Shi Zhengrong, executive chairman of Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., was hoarse and exhausted. When the phone was connected, he was on the high-speed rail from Wuxi to Shanghai.
In the past few days, the 49-year-old former Chinese richest man has been rushing for the survival of Suntech Power, the world's largest PV company. In the second half of the year, he wrote letters to the top officials of the Jiangsu Provincial Government and the State Council leaders for help, but the feedback received was not optimistic. Suntech is heavily in debt, but the market is weak. The photovoltaic â€œdouble-reverseâ€ between the United States and the European Union has made this photovoltaic empire crumbling.
Shi Zhengrong was not in trouble for the first time. He returned to China for 11 years and he has encountered trouble more than once. However, he admits that there is no such thing as a lifeline like today: debt is huge, losses continue, executives are leaving, and the United States and Europe are double-reverse... "internal and external troubles" is Suntech's best footnote, "I don't know tomorrow." Where." He told China Entrepreneur.
The securities market also witnessed the fall of the Chinese star company. Suntech Power (NYSE: STP)'s share price on the New York Stock Exchange has fallen from a maximum of $86 per share at the end of 2007 to less than $1. Since the stock price was less than US$1 for 30 consecutive trading days as of September 10, Suntech received a warning from the NYSE.
Compared with Suntech, LDK, another giant in the photovoltaic industry located upstream of the industrial chain, is in a more dangerous situation. The photovoltaic company, known for its rapid expansion, has to pay for its aggressiveness â€“ its debt ratio is as high as 93% (as of June 30), which puts it under huge debt-servicing pressure. This year alone, Saiwei will have about $2 billion in debt maturity, but as of June 30, its cash and cash equivalents are only $296.2 million, and bankruptcy is even more worrying.
In the past ten years, if there is an industry-covered aura that rivals the Internet, it must be photovoltaic; if there is an industry that is as rich as the Internet, it must be photovoltaic; if there is an industry capable of attracting capital and the Internet Compared with the United States, it must be photovoltaic; and if there is an industry that motivates local governments to chase more than real estate, it must be photovoltaic. Suntech and Saiwei used to be the two most representative enterprises in the sunrise industry, which can be called the â€œdouble maleâ€. The founders of the two companies, Shi Zhengrong and Peng Xiaofeng, are new generation entrepreneurs. They themselves and the companies they created have played a leading role in the development of the industry.
Nowadays, the "double males" have fallen into the altar, and their survival is worrying. Among them, there are naturally individual entrepreneurs' decision-making mistakes and personality defects, but for an emerging industry with a history of only ten years, the two start early, strong, and sought after. The company's rapid "premature aging" has highlighted the unusual deformity of the industry.
The Chinese PV industry is faced with a fantasy scene of sorrow and joy. The good news is that in just a few years, China's PV production capacity has accounted for more than half of the world's total. The world's top 10 PV module manufacturers have taken the top five in China. Sadly, in the context of anti-dumping lawsuits in Europe and the United States, the entire photovoltaic industry In a big rout, several big players are close to insolvency. This is actually paying for the contradiction accumulated during the industrial outbreak. On the one hand, the government encourages the rapid development of photovoltaic enterprises; on the other hand, the domestic market has not made any big moves on the issues of on-grid electricity prices and grid connection.
The disorder and out of control of capacity expansion, and the resulting international rebound, eventually became the last straw to overwhelm the "Sun God." "If this EU anti-dumping case is finally turned into a high-tax rate, the impact on China's PV industry will be huge. It may cause 50%-60% of the enterprises to go bankrupt." Changzhou Trina Solar CEO Gao Jiyao Said this summer at the Davos Forum.
Today, the fate of Suntech and Saiwei is not in the hands of Shi Zhengrong and Peng Xiaofeng, but depends on the support of the government and banks. What is amazing is that the fate of their initial business is also in the hands of both. "They interpreted a tragedy of the proliferation of China's emerging industries." An official of the Wuxi Municipal Government bluntly told the "Chinese Entrepreneur" that the government has an unshirkable responsibility to the present.
"The great things happen, half of the fate, half by manpower", Zeng Guofan and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom have repeatedly sighed when they fought repeatedly, and this round of photovoltaic sadness seems to be a superposition of destiny and manpower. However, one question that slams the hearts of the industry but is inconvenient to say is, what role should the government play in promoting the development of emerging industries? In 2006, when Suntech landed at the New York Stock Exchange, this magazine discussed the â€œWuxi modelâ€ of independent innovation. We believe that when the whole of China, from the government to the enterprise, is looking for the specific path of independent innovation, it is necessary to search for it. The rise of Suntech's star may mean that a model that has not yet fully matured and supports independent innovation of high-tech enterprises has emerged. The simple understanding of the â€œWuxi modelâ€ is: an enlightened government that finds a well-known person or organization with capital and business management awareness to represent the â€œgovernmentâ€ and integrates various resources, including policy, capital, technology, and market. Together, support the company, and then retired (see the cover article of the magazine in March 2006, "the richest man, the government made"). However, after six years, we have to reflect on the natural flaws in this model: â€œItâ€™s hard to get away from itâ€, but â€œbefore and afterâ€ is often the trend â€“ when more than 600 cities in China use photovoltaics as a strategic emerging industry, polysilicon When the furnace blooms like the steel of the year, the results are not difficult to predict.
The industry that has been ripened by the government's tangible hands and is rapidly declining is more than the photovoltaic industry? Similar stories have been repeated in many emerging industries such as biomass, wind power and LED. "Next, wind power and LED industry are likely to have double opposition." The above-mentioned people said that if entrepreneurs are wrong, then the government's hand is more wrong. .
The more embarrassing question is, if the government is trying to build an industry wrong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India have many opposite examples. Why are their success rates much higher?
For the large-scale and tens of thousands of employees, the difficulties encountered are far from being solved by local governments at the beginning of their business.
On the afternoon of September 14, the Suntech headquarters of Wuxi High-tech Development Zone, the p2 factory in the peak of the off-duty period was empty and depressed, and only a few managers passed by. The security guards waited and watched the passers-by in a vigilant manner. As night falls, the staff quarters are dark and uncomfortable.
Here is Suntechâ€™s battery factory, where Shi Zhengrongâ€™s proud Pluto battery is produced. It has been completely discontinued since September.
The p3 factory, which is opposite to the p2, is another scene. More than 10 employees of Wuxi Pioneer Automation Equipment Co., Ltd., in Wuxi High-tech Zone, were trapped at the factory gate. A red extension truck ran across the gate and blocked the factory gate. Dozens of traffic police, police and security guards on the scene nervously maintained order.
A vice president of Wuxi Pilot Automation Equipment Co., Ltd. is in the process of â€œconfrontationâ€ with the relevant procurement manager of Suntech, and asked for arrears of more than 20 million yuan of equipment for more than one year. â€œShangde not only does not repay, but also no longer cooperates with us. The technology was handed over to another Wuxi counterpart, and the cost of one piece of equipment (mainly the loading machine and the cutting machine) was nearly 200,000."
The vice president said that Shi Zhengrong was trying to reduce costs, and they worried that Suntech would go bankrupt. The same labor insurance company that cooperated with Suntech also had the same concern. They said that they had stopped supplying Suntech.
Saiwei is experiencing the same pain. In the suburb of Xinyu, Jiangxi, the Mahong silicon material base of LDK has been quiet for several months. It used to be the largest single-cell silicon production base in the world. Just over a year ago, it was still full of people. The thousands of young people recruited by Savi from Xinyu, Nanchang and other parts of the country were busy day and night. A silent ruin.
"The staff has been laid off since the beginning of the year. At that time, the leaders will tell you that they can find a job and leave quickly. The company can't manage it." A Saiwei employee who asked not to be named recalled.
Such a grim and embarrassing situation, they also encountered at the beginning of the business, Shi Zhengrong through his office window, watching the employees of the factory to sell. Only three months after the listing of the company on the NYSE, it was due to a letter of infringement from the employee, which led to a stock price stagnation and a class action lawsuit against shareholders. Even with the advent of the financial turmoil, Suntech, who is in difficulty, is still small. The main leaders of Wuxi City coordinate the local banksâ€™ billion-dollar loans to let Suntech tide over the difficulties. Saiwei also has 15% of the 15,000-ton polysilicon project due to financial constraints. The price of 1.5 billion yuan was transferred to Jiangxi International Trust, and then successfully redeemed. Today, for the large-scale and tens of thousands of employees, the difficulties they encounter are far from being solved by local governments.
Now, the two companies not only need to spend tens of billions of dollars. The bigger problem is that the photovoltaic market is more than the production capacity in 2008. The depression has lasted for nearly two years and the short-term recovery is hopeless, and the last crisis was only half a year. Recovery, demand even skyrocketed. "In 2008, Shi Zhengrong's situation was only to look at the difficulties. Because the funds were sufficient after the listing in 2006, it was not able to move the bones. This year's difficulties are really difficult. I am already dying. He can't turn over. It is totally difficult to say." Wuxi City Government officials revealed.
The biggest problem facing Shi Zhengrong is that by March next year, Suntechâ€™s short-term debts were as high as $1.575 billion, and convertible bonds amounted to $511 million, totaling $2.086 billion. This figure is 70% of Suntechâ€™s 2011 full-year revenue. . He must find "buyers" for these debts in the shortest possible time, and even carry out corporate restructuring for this purpose.
"Why are Savi, Suntech encounter such a big difficulty today, because their debts are too high, and they know how much they owe. Saiwei is the most owed money in all solar energy companies in China, ranking second. Itâ€™s Suntech.â€ Solarbuzz China analyst Lian Rui told China Entrepreneur.
The main reason is that Suntech and Saiwei continued to expand their liabilities before the growth of the PV market slowed down. In 2011 alone, Suntech expanded its PV capacity from 1.8GW to 2.4GW, while the increase of 0.6GW is equivalent to the total installed capacity of PV grid-connected power generation in China in 2010. As a result, Suntechâ€™s net loss last year reached $1 billion, and Saiwei lost 5.4 billion yuan.
The head of a trading company in Chicago, USA, described Suntech in his eyes. "The current understanding of Suntech in the market is that Suntech will go bankrupt sooner or later! This concept is not right, but it gives the impression that Suntech is committing suicide. â€
He said that in 2011, the United States carried out "double opposition" to China's photovoltaic industry. Due to the punitive import tariffs of the United States, the profits of companies such as Suntech declined sharply, and many small enterprises died suddenly. At that time, Shi Zhengrong, who was driving Suntech on the highway, did not brake. Suntech once suicidal sales, and at the same time expanded the production capacity, which directly aggravated Suntech's current difficulties.
More serious is the EU's double-reverse investigation of the domestic PV industry. Zhang Jianmin, Suntech's public relations manager, told the magazine that the European market accounts for 45% of Suntech's sales, the US accounts for 20%, and other regions including China, Japan, the Middle East, and Africa account for more than 30%. If Europe launches a double-reverse, it is a fatal blow to Suntech.
Not only that, the Indian industry is applying to the Indian Anti-Dumping Agency for anti-dumping investigations on solar modules or parts exported from China or other countries and regions. Among the companies that export solar cell modules, Suntech has the largest export volume.
In order to tide over the difficulties, at the LDK Shareholders' Meeting held in mid-September, Saiwei announced that it has transferred some real estate properties and land use rights to the local Xinyu City Government to raise funds. Earlier, Xinyu City Government was also accused of using the fiscal revenue as the trust loan of Saiwei. The relevant departments of the Jiangxi Provincial Government also led the State Development Bank's Jiangxi Branch and other institutions to provide over RMB 2 billion in revolving loans.
All of this is just a drop in the bucket. â€œA big hole of tens of billions of scale can be made up with such a small patch?â€ A PV industry person shook his head helplessly. "You know, the entire fiscal revenue of Xinyu City is one billion yuan a year."
The pain of winter is to pay for the mistakes of summer.
Although the industry is at a low point, as an entrepreneur, Shi Zhengrong and Peng Xiaofeng made the wrong decision at several critical moments in the ascending period, which is an important reason why they feel extraordinarily cold in winter.
Shi Zhengrong's character is relatively restrained. A PV expert told this reporter that Shi Zhengrong had just returned to China for business ten years ago. He made a special trip to visit and dine for the enthusiasm. In order to be active, I don't know which one proposed to let this "Mr. Yang" Sing a song, "The young man sang a song very embarrassed, very embarrassed." But as Suntech's aura is more and more dazzling, he is gradually able to cope with all kinds of occasions, at the conference of thousands of people. Singing a tin show can also have a good eye.
After many people contact Shi Zhengrong, they feel that he is more like a scientist than a mature entrepreneur. Shi Zhengrong did not resist this. He even enjoyed the identity of scientists and the feeling of â€œcross-borderâ€ by scientists to entrepreneurs.
"China has made great contributions to the world's photovoltaic industry, and we have shortened the development of this industry for more than 10 years." Shi Zhengrong is still proud of the achievements he has made in more than a decade.
He has been hailed as a "sun god" by foreign media. He often said that one-third of his time is used to preach new energy is the future of mankind. He is also keen to make appearances in various high-level forums and academic conferences. In 2009, Suntech had a crisis. When Shi Zhengrong accepted an interview with this reporter, he said that he does not need to reflect. "I have always been like this. I am not an entrepreneur. I am a scientist." Shi Zhengrong admitted that his time was divided. Three roles - entrepreneurs, social activists, scientists.
However, he is also very tired of his reputation. When the industry is booming, every month, new energy companies, experts and officials from home and abroad visit Shangde. There are several times a day. "Shangde is bothered, but there is no way to be famous." A Wuxi City Letter The person in charge of the solar photovoltaic industry promotion office said to the "Chinese entrepreneurs."
The uncertainty of his role and positioning makes Shi Zhengrong's decision-making often full of contradictions, sometimes too advanced, and sometimes too short-sighted. "This industry generally has to look far, but I have to deal with the immediate situation. I have to deal with orders in front of me. Is it still so hot?" In the face of this reporter, why not stop expanding earlier? In the question of layoffs and other measures, Shi Zhengrong explained this at the end of 2009.
In 2005, Shi Zhengrong invested in a thin-film battery factory in Shanghai, and was soon forced to close due to the plunge in polysilicon prices, losing more than $50 million. Polysilicon in 2006 was a toon. Shi Zhengrong was almost soft-hardened. He and the MEMC CEO were on the phone every day before signing a 10-year, $6 billion purchase order. At that time, some executives raised objections and thought that the agreement price was too high, but Shi Zhengrong thought that this was a decision to succeed or fail and rejected the opinion of the executive. The following story is well known to the outside world. Due to the plunge in polysilicon prices, Shi Zhengrong has no choice but to terminate the contract with MEMC for a $212 million liquidated damages. But he does not admit that this is his own strategic mistake, but it is attributed to the unpredictability of the financial crisis.
After the financial crisis, Shi Zhengrong also invested in the European Global Solar Fund Management Company (GSF), which made a significant contribution to Suntech's 2010 profit, which made Shi Zhengrong proud, but the GSF counter-guarantee broke out at the end of July this year. The scam shows the complexity of the transaction and may even cause Suntech to suffer significant losses.
People close to Shi Zhengrong told this magazine that many insiders commented on Shi Zhengrong that he is a good scientist, but not a good CEO, not a good corporate helm and leader. When the overall situation is not stable, Shi Zhengrong seems to be a little excited in the past few years, and he has put his energy outside the business too early.
Shi Zhengrong is enough for "foreign." He is fluent in English and has a broad vision, creating a team that is the most multinational company in the photovoltaic industry. Peng Xiaofeng, who is also introverted in character, is enough to "earth". He graduated from the Foreign Trade College and started working as a labor insurance product. Compared with Shi Zhengrong's "long and short line out of focus", Peng Xiaofeng is more like an "opportunist." When he decided to enter the photovoltaic industry in 2004, he was less than 30 years old. The young man was eager to find a new gold mine. "He considered real estate and even stocks, but later ruled out one by one." A person familiar with Peng Xiaofeng revealed.
In fact, the field of silicon wafers upstream of PV is still a traditional industry for Peng Xiaofeng. It is necessary to policy, build factories, buy equipment, and recruit workers. During the industry's grassroots period, Peng's foreign trade production experience makes him feel like a duck in the photovoltaic industry. . He has always adopted the most radical strategy, hoping to leave all potential competitors behind him from the starting point. This is also the atmosphere that shrouded the industry at that time. The so-called "silicon is king, and production is golden." He did lead for several years. Saiwei's wafer production capacity was on the rise, and the company was listed on the New York Stock Exchange two years later.
Later, the silicon project that caused a heavy blow to Saiwei was launched in 2008. At that time, the most upstream part of silicon material was almost completely in the hands of foreign manufacturers, and occupied 70% of the profits in the industrial chain. The price of polysilicon reached more than 400 US dollars per kilogram. Peng Xiaofeng was ambitious to break this deadlock.
Although it belongs to different links of the industrial chain, but going upstream, polysilicon manufacturing belongs to the chemical industry. It is a completely strange field for Peng Xiaofeng, and he still hopes to replicate the success of the previous expansion of silicon wafer capacity. The polysilicon project was the largest in the world at that time, with an investment of 12 billion yuan, most of which came from bank loans.
However, it turns out that the experience of his manufacturing industry is difficult to control chemical projects, and the polysilicon project has become a bottomless pit. Peng Xiaofeng also invested in the Suzhou Best Battery Battery and Module Project in 2008. In 2010, he invested in the component project in Hefei. Most of them are opportunistic followers, but luck is not always on his shoulder. These are not successful. Investment, like the seaweed that is constantly being tied to the giant wheel of Saiwei, has gradually lost its engine.
The tangible hand fattened the industry, but it only aggravated the market
"When it is difficult, find more leaders." Shi Zhengrong told "Chinese Entrepreneur" that he is making various efforts for the survival of enterprises.
However, the mentality of the local government is much more complicated than that of Shi Zhengrong when he first went to Wuxi. "If Shi Zhengrong had a problem, he would send a text message to the 'big leader'. The leader was very annoyed by him." Anonymous local Wuxi official It is said that the attitude of Suntech in the Wuxi Municipal Government is divided into two factions. It continues to be supported by supporters. It is believed that those who follow the rules of the market to let them do their own thing.
However, PV has never been a market-oriented industry. Whether it is Suntech or Saiwei, it is inseparable from the hands of the government. â€œWhen I returned to China, including domestic professors, I didnâ€™t know the word PV.â€ Shi Zhengrong told this reporter. A well-known bridge is that a report 11 years ago made the Wuxi city government look forward to and decided to let him be the boss.
In the founding of Suntech, in addition to a bloody and full of knowledge, Shi Zhengrong only has 400,000 US dollars. The Wuxi Municipal Government used similar administrative orders to allow the eight local state-owned enterprises to make a total of 6.5 million US dollars to invest in Suntech. They even prepared for the "this money has been so sloppy", which can finally prove that it is quite worthwhile. The investment, of course, if they can accompany Suntech to the end of the listing, the harvest will be more, but also with the support of the government, the state-owned shares will withdraw before listing.
Peng Xiaofengâ€™s contact with the government is also very active. "He has a magical power to make impossible things." A PV analyst once commented on Peng Xiaofeng. When starting a business, it is said that only half an hour, Peng Xiaofengâ€™s dream of â€œworld-class photovoltaic enterprisesâ€ touched Wang Dehe, then the mayor of Xinyu City. He obtained preferential policies for land and electricity prices and matching funds of 200 million yuan.
The early PV heroes were once the guest of the local government. The government needs political achievements. The photovoltaic industry is both an emerging industry and a large number of jobs. The two sides naturally hit it off. And the company has an international influence, and the two sides are actually mutually tied.
In 2011, the output value of Wuxi's entire industrial sector was 1.5 trillion, and Suntech accounted for nearly 30 billion. A local official analyzed that for Wuxi, the political significance of Suntech's output value is far greater than the economic significance. "If you are more than one of the other industries, Wuxi is not necessarily one of the best in the country, and if it is more than photovoltaic, Suntech is the world's number one, which greatly satisfies the vanity of the Wuxi municipal government."
Great success is often difficult to achieve, local governments hope that enterprises will grow bigger, and even give specific expansion requirements, which also kidnapped entrepreneurs, in order to vote for their good, they began to drive like a driver, full speed overtaking.
The rise of Suntech and Saiwei has stimulated other local governments. In the half year after the listing of Suntech, hundreds of cities across the country established a photovoltaic development base, trying to replicate the Wuxi model, which is a large number of enterprises from the fields of clothing, textiles, printing and dyeing. Most of them have no core technology, and they are put into the market only by purchasing original parts and assembling parts.
"This industry is not easy to retreat. Even if the company is in a difficult time, the government will not let it go out and support it to expand production capacity, so the entire industry will not be able to produce capacity." The above-mentioned government officials told this magazine that the photovoltaic industry is just like this after the government is fattening. Get into a deadlock.
The US government noticed the impact of China's PV industry on the US market a few years ago. Four or five years ago, the US's PV against China was looming, and local governments with selective deafness did not respond early to help companies clear roadblocks. Thousands of PV companies are not aware of the need to slow down. Regarding subsidies, that is, the issue of science and technology policy is not a subsidy, until the end of last year, the Ministry of Commerce gave a clear statement.
For the Suntech crisis, an official of the Wuxi Science and Technology Bureau believes that the first is that the enterprise is expanding too fast, the local government wants it to grow bigger, and the country has given a lot of honor, which makes the company unable to act according to objective laws. Very terrible, this also reflects the history of the rise and fall of Chinese enterprises. It is only for Suntech that this rise and fall is too fast."
In fact, after Suntech changed from small to large and changed from the world's first to the successive bankruptcy rumors, the relationship between the local government and Suntech has undergone subtle changes, and it has been conditionally supported by the unconditional support of the past. "Government supports you, how do you plan? You can't say that you are totally dependent on the government. You have to come up with a goal and attitude." The local officials mentioned above dissatisfiedly told the "Chinese Entrepreneur" that Shi Zhengrong is not a poor man. The government hopes to help. At the same time of Suntech, Shi can also take some money from his wealth, but Shi did not make a clear statement, "it seems to prefer to let the company go bankrupt."
In his new book, "Big But Not Down," the New York Times chief reporter Andrew Ross Sorkin showed that in the 2008 US financial crisis, individual financial groups were so large that they could affect systemic risks, thus causing the US government to fall into the trap. The dilemma of forced rescue. Under all kinds of care, after a round of expansion, Shi Zhengrong and Peng Xiaofeng almost made Suntech and Saiwei "big but not down." The rapid growth of enterprises also has the ability to kidnap the government, thus ensuring security to a certain extent. "The main idea of â€‹â€‹his present is that I have so many employees. If you don't save me, you have to close the door and become such a thing."
The same is true for Saiwei. From a financial point of view, Saiwei, which relies on debt to achieve expansion, has been unable to support it. However, this new energy-marking enterprise will not simply follow the natural laws of the market economy to survive the fittest. It is not only a business card of Xinyu City, but also the first US listed company and the second largest taxpayer in Jiangxi Province. Saiwei also has more than 20,000 employees, involving social employment and stability.
But the cracks have been buried a few years ago. 2009 was the first year of the national start of the Golden Sun Project. Suntech applied for the solar photovoltaic building application project of 1100 kW Luoyang Teachers College under the condition that the whole project capital and return period were not well understood. However, it did not advance according to the construction period, and the second year was because the â€œcannot be implementedâ€ entered the cancellation list. Some insiders said that Shi Zhengrong could not do it, because it was not because it sold the components to make money than the Golden Sun project. "Shi Zhengrong simply does not see the domestic market."
The official said that Suntechâ€™s work affected Wuxiâ€™s entire Golden Sun project, and in 2012 it was not approved for a Golden Sun project. As a result, the Provincial Development and Reform Commission and the National Development and Reform Commission have made "very good opinions." For Suntech, it also lost a good time to open the domestic market.
Photovoltaics is only the most extreme example. In recent years, the concept of â€œemerging industriesâ€ has been rampant, and many local governments are keen to make various plans. However, from the beginning to the end of the plan, we can only see the goal of making the industry multi-large. The specific plans for the industry and the specific plans for upstream and downstream support are completely lacking. "This is not a plan, it can only be called It is a vision book." The above Wuxi Science and Technology Bureau officials lamented.
For emerging industries such as photovoltaics, local governments aiming at political achievements are like predators. After some ups and downs, local GDP has increased, leaving behind a mess.
Even if this time lucky enough to get the ticket for Noah's Ark, the PV giant needs to be wary of "government dependence."
"Everyone is waiting for the opponent to die first. You are dead in your market. It's just like this. It's the last thing to see who is dead, and the last one will survive." A photovoltaic industry expert To analyze the current situation in this way is to see who is long.
In 2011, in order to maintain the image, Shi Zhengrong insisted on increasing product shipments, and customers were satisfied with their needs. Peng Xiaofeng also chose to expand against the trend. He established nine new companies last year, including four production companies. And 5 sales companies. Pengâ€™s logic is to be strong, to grow bigger, even if the market does not support it.
Such a scale of worship and price shopping, faintly shadow of the early development of the home appliance industry. As the industry has said, the photovoltaic industry is actually a manufacturing industry with high-tech outerwear. In recent years, there have been no major technological breakthroughs, and the main competition is the cost. Only by expanding the scale can the cost be reduced, and the scale can be expanded without any drink and thirst. It is precisely the sign that the industry is still immature. The problem is that the industry â€œlikes the sudden entry of a kindergarten into a university, and it grows so fast under policy support.â€
It can be mentioned that Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and India have all taken the government's power to support an industry, but they have rarely fallen into similar difficulties. Their experience is that more policies are introduced to encourage the development of the industry, rather than local governments to support local enterprises, and in the implementation process, industrial policies are highly valued to prevent economic laws from functioning, whether it is financial support or talent cultivation. The Japanese and Korean governments have paid great attention to the core of providing a relatively stable market for enterprises.
In China, local governments often support the many industries at any cost. In fact, they cannot simply condemn their blindness regardless of economic laws. Because they look up, the policies of emerging industries are often ambiguous and they can only test the height of the ceiling. Taking photovoltaics as an example, the prediction of overheating in the industry has gone through the period of rapid development of the industry. Only when the leaders are hitting the European and American double-reverse, when it is on the verge of destruction, adjustment is imminent.
Over time, due to the loss of photovoltaic industry, Xinyu City has shifted its key development industries to outdoor lighting, equipment manufacturing and biomedicine, while Wuxi has turned its focus to the Internet of Things. â€œDo you think the Internet of Things is promising? Probably, but To put it bluntly, the government valued it because of the achievements of this thing.â€ A local business person lamented that the government would not reflect on it.
At the moment, waiting for salvation seems to be the only choice for PV â€œdoublesâ€. The industry has exposed rumors that Suntech will be reorganized by Wuxi Guolian and Suntech intends to issue bonds. In this regard, Cui Baichang, director of Citibank Global Investment Bank China, believes that Suntech is unlikely to issue bonds because this financial situation is not subscribed by investors.
At the end of September, Wuxi Mayor Zhu Kejiang went to Shangde to work on the spot, bringing the best news to Shi Zhengrong for several months. The Wuxi Municipal Government has planned to help Suntech Power out of the crisis by coordinating financial institutions and issuing policies. The Bank of China has issued the first batch of 200 million yuan.
Where is Saiweiâ€™s road to salvation? Although Li Weiji, a spokesman for Saiwei, denied the possibility of nationalization of the company, local state-owned enterprises such as Pingmei Shenma Group and Jiangxi Copper were all contacted. The "ä¸" prefix of the central enterprise and the sneak peek of the savior is even more fascinating - in this business directory of the savior rescuers, China Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Group Corporation, China Power Investment Group, China National Materials Group and China National Building Materials Group Itâ€™s awesome. "China Power Investment and China Energy Conservation are still talking about it." Relevant persons of Xinyu City Government confirmed. No matter who you are, digesting tens of billions of debt requires a strong stomach.
After the financial crisis, there has been a trend of state-owned new energy companies moving from downstream to upstream. Perhaps after another round, companies that have created several â€œrichest peopleâ€ will be replaced by new owners.
The outcome of Saiwei is largely determined by the level of government support for the photovoltaic industry and Saiwei itself. The financial strength of Jiangxi Province and Xinyu City is not strong. Suntech and Saiwei are waiting for Godot in an upcoming process of government-led and will determine the final reorganization of the industry.
However, among the 12 PV companies (six big and six small) that CDB recently announced to focus on ensuring the credit line, the controversial Suntech and Saiwei are still included in the list. This may mean that Shih Phong may be lucky enough to get a ticket to Noah's Ark at a time when many of his peers are facing the "doomsday." But what is equally worrying is whether this kind of rescue will further deepen the â€œgovernment dependenceâ€ of the PV giants.
Analysts believe that, more importantly, the photovoltaic industry is currently facing deep reshuffle. If local governments are as good as Wuxi, it will seriously delay the adjustment of the industry and make the market difficult to metabolize. If the local government is deeply involved in the development of the photovoltaic industry, it is likely to push the industry to no return.
A staff member of the Wuxi Municipal Government said: "The government wants to save Shi Zhengrong not for him personally. Suntech represents not only a company but also the face of our local government." However, in the next brutal knockout, the final result will be decided. There are still many factors. "The country just pulls one hand and helps to tide over the difficulties. It depends on the company itself."
"This industry is definitely going to be integrated." Shi Zhengrong still hopes for the government's policy. "What we are dealing with now is not the issue of capital, technology, cost, but policy. The government should guide this industry. If investors and consumers can directly Trading, I believe that solar energy will definitely have a market in China."
Peng Xiaofeng is always full of confidence on the phone. "Photovoltaic is really not very good now, but after the industry improves, there are still many opportunities."
A few months ago, he told the media that the industry now looks at Savi, just like Steve Jobs ten years ago.
Is that true?
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